The Adjustment of Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Party Cooperation Policy After the Wannan Incident by WANG, Jin
35 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
 ISSN 1712-8358[Print]
ISSN 1923-6700[Online]
   www.cscanada.net
www.cscanada.org
Cross-Cultural Communication
Vol. 12, No. 4, 2016, pp. 35-38
DOI:10.3968/8340
The Adjustment of Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Party Cooperation Policy 
After the Wannan Incident
WANG Jin[a],*
[a]Chongqing Hongyan Museum of Revolutionary History, Chongqing, 
China. 
*Corresponding author.
Received 5 January 2016; accepted 14 March 2016 
Published online 26 April 2016
Abstract
Wannan Incident, as an important event significantly 
affecting the Anti-Japanese War and Kuomintang (KMT)-
Communist Party of China (CPC) relationship during 
the second KMT-CPC cooperation, has promoted KMT 
and CPC to make significant adjustment in policy under 
the premise of continuing to resist Japan. The KMT-
CPC relationship and their policy adjustment, from a 
fundamental point of view, depend on the development 
of the Sino-Japanese contradiction. Under the leadership 
of CPC Central Committee, the Southern Bureau has 
implemented the Party’s principles and policies as the 
CPC delegation and Eighth Route Army office. It has 
taken a principled but flexible strategy to promote the 
democratic political process in the KMT ruled areas, and 
has made outstanding contributions in maintaining the 
KMT-CPC cooperation and the Anti-Japanese national 
united front.
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INTRODUCTION
After the Wannan Incident, although the KMT-CPC 
relationship was difficult to return to the initial cooperative 
situation before the Anti-Japanese War, the risks of major 
military conflicts and comprehensive breakdown no longer 
appeared. Before the Wannan Incident and the Battle of 
Hunan, Guangxi and Henan, under the premise of a united 
fight against Japan, with the development of international 
situation and the changes of domestic situation, KMT 
and CPC continued to adjust their policies to coordinate 
conflicts and maintain the basic Anti-Japanese cooperation. 
Under the leadership of CPC Central Committee, the 
Southern Bureau has implemented the Party’s principles 
and policies as the CPC delegation and Eighth Route 
Army office, assisted to resolve conflicts and the serious 
negative impacts of Wannan Incident, tried to win broad 
sympathy and support from middle parties, and promoted 
the democratic political process in the KMT ruled areas.
1. WANNAN INCIDENT: THE STRONG 
PERFORMANCE OF KMT’S POLICY 
TOWARD CPC
The direct source of Wannan Incident lies in the rupture 
of KMT-CPC negotiation on military demarcation. On 
July 16, 1940, the KMT negotiators formally drawn up 
the “Proposal of the Central Government”, and submitted 
to Zhou Enlai, the CPC negotiator and secretary of the 
Southern Bureau on February 21. The CPC Central 
Committee was not opposed to demarcation, but could 
not accept the narrow area of Chahar Province and Hebei 
province, proposing the five provinces in North China 
to be the combat zone for the Eighth Route Army and 
the New Fourth Army. Jiang Jieshi completely rejected 
this proposal and claimed, “If the Eighth Route Army 
and New Fourth Army cannot move to the north shore of 
the Yellow River, all problems cannot be resolved”.1 On 
1 Zhou Enlai’s Telegram to the Secretariat of the CPC Central 
Committee. (1940, August 28).
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November 14, He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi ordered the 
military office to make the “Battle Plan to Destroy the 
Bandit Troops at South of the Yellow River”, requiring 
Jiang Jieshi to approve for implementation. Jiang Jieshi 
approved this plan on December 7, and repeatedly told the 
army to “fight a guerrilla war against enemy’s weakness”, 
and must never affect the overall situation due to 
misdirection (Jiang Zhongzheng’s Telegram to Officer Li, 
1941, pp.121-122). After January 6, 1941, when Wannan 
Incident broke out, except for 1,300 people who managed 
to break out of the encirclement, most of the 9,000 
soldiers of New Fourth Army in southern Anhui province 
lost their lives, some were captured. The commander Ye 
Ting was detained.
This raised a storm of controversy in the world and 
CPC reacted strongly. Faced with the problem of how to 
solve the aftermath of Wannan Incident, disagreement 
occurred within the KMT.
Before and after the Wannan Incident, there were three 
factions within KMT on the policy toward CPC. One 
faction was represented by Bai Chongxi, who urged to 
form a stalemate with Japan and immediately implement 
the anti-CPC military plan, and was not afraid of breaking 
down with CPC. One faction was presented by He 
Zhonghan and Zhang Zhizhong, who opposed the military 
plan and advocated to resolve conflict by negotiation, 
proposing to take special solutions for special problems. 
Jiang Jieshi’s preference is the faction represented by 
Hu Qiuyuan, who proposed that “the best time to strike 
CPC is when the massive counterattack against Japan 
is launched”, and “fight for time to be fully prepared”. 
“Get close to the region of CPC, establish bunkers to 
prevent their expansion. This can narrow the future 
encirclement and push forward the strongholds, forcing 
CPC to have conflict with the Japanese. It may be called 
as shooting two hawks with one arrow”. On January 
17, KMT, on behalf of the spokesman of the military 
committee, declared that the New Fourth Army “breached 
discipline, did not comply with the disposal, revolted to 
attack the arm in the front.” Therefore, the New Fourth 
Army’s designation was revoked, and the commander 
Ye Ting would be transferred to military tribunal for trial 
(Anonymous, 1941).
2. CPC’S FIGHT POLICY IN RESPONSE 
TO THE WANNAN INCIDENT 
When CPC noted the occurrence of the incident, CPC 
Central Committee telegraphed to Zhou Enlai, the leader 
of the South Bureau, requiring him to make a solemn 
representation to KMT for an immediate withdrawal and 
to prove that KMT did not mean to disrupt cooperation. 
Zhou Enlai held an emergency meeting within Southern 
Bureau to study the situation and struggle policy after the 
incident, as well as various measures to be taken. Under 
the guidance of the Central Committee, the Southern 
Bureau made a serious protest to KMT and revealed the 
truth by breaking through the blockade. They exposed 
KMT’s conspiracy of attacking New Fourth Army on 
Xinhua Daily, and condemned the KMT diehards’ crime 
through public lawful activities. Meanwhile, the provoked 
CPC began a positive military preparation. On January 12, 
Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi telegraphed to the CPC Central 
Committee and proposed, “Please instruct Zhu, Chen 
and Luo to be ready to besiege Shen Honglie. We are 
prepared to besiege Han Deqin in exchange for KMT’s 
(cease on the siege of New Fourth Army in South Anhui 
Province).”2 On January 13, Mao Zedong replied to Liu 
Shaoqi, “Agree Hu and Chen’s telegraph on January 
12. Army in northern Jiangsu be ready to surround Han 
Deqin, army in Shandong be ready to surround Shen 
Honglie. The two armies shall be ready within ten days 
on standby to attack”. “We’ re ready for an immediate 
massive counterattack in politics and military” “in reply to 
Jiang Jieshi’s annihilation plan to our one million people 
in southern Anhui Province”. “If our force in Southern 
Anhui Province is destroyed by Jiang Jieshi, we shall 
resolutely and thoroughly destroy Han Deqin and Shen 
Honglie to solve the central China problem.”3 On the same 
day, Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying came to Liu Weizhang 
to state the situation of Wannan Incident. On January 14, 
Zhou Enlai once again protested to Jiang Jieshi through 
Zhang Chong. Zhang Chong replied to him after reported 
to Jiang Jieshi that, Jiang Jieshi required Zhou and Ye 
to tell the CPC Central Committee “not to worsen the 
situation”. Jiang Jieshi’s attitude was very clear, 
(a) New Fourth Army in North Central China shall not be 
obstructed. It’s heard that it’s the New Fourth Army to take the 
first shoot. (b) I hope that the New Fourth Army will proceed to 
Northern China. (c) If this route is blocked, it is also acceptable 
to move to Northern Anhui Province. I have ordered Li Pinxian 
not to put obstacles in the way. (d) I have ordered to issue one 
hundred thousand bullets and pay to New Fourth Army after they 
cross the river.4
Based on the considerations on the political offensive, 
on January 20, the CPC Central Military Commission 
released the command to rebuild New Fourth Army. 
On January 22, Mao Zedong issued a statement as the 
spokesman of CPC Central Military Commission and 
proposed 12 measures to resolve Wannan Incident: a) 
Stop provocations; b) Revoke the reactionary command 
on January 17 and announced to be completely wrong; c) 
2 Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi’s recommendations on the military attack 
in Jiangsu and Shandong to Mao Zedong. (1941, January 12), 
Wannan Incident (Selected Data), pp.136-137.
3 Mao Zedong, Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang’s instructions on the 
military attack in Jinagsu and Shandong in reply to Wannan Incident. 
(1941, January 13), Wannan Incident (Selected Data), pp.139-140.
4 Mao Zedong, Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang’s briefing to Liu Shaoqi 
and Ye Ting on Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying’s negotiate with Jiang 
Jieshi. (1941, January 14), Wannan Incident (Selected Data), p.144.
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Punish the culprits of Wannan Incident He Yingqin, Gu 
Zhutong and Shangguan Yunxiang; d) Set Ye Ting free 
and he shall continue to serve as the commander of New 
Fourth Army; e) Return the New Fourth Army troops 
and guns; f) Comfort and compensate all casualties of 
New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui Province; Retreat 
the “Communist suppression” forces in Central China; 
g) Demolish the blockade line in Northwest China; h) 
Release all arrested patriotic political prisoners; 10. 
Abolish one-party dictatorship, implement democratic 
politics; i) Implement the Three People’s Principles, 
obey “the prime minister’s will”; j) Arrest all the pro-
Japanese faction leaders to deliver for trial.5 After the 
receipt of Mao Zedong’s talk and CPC Central Military 
Commission’s order, the Southern Bureau immediately 
organized reproduction and widely disseminated in 
different social circles. 
Moscow was not in favor of Mao Zedong’s estimation 
of the situation and envisaged countermeasures. On 
January 4 the eve of the incident, Dimitrov, the general 
secretary of the Communist International, warned Mao 
Zedong in telegraph concerning his fierce attitude toward 
KMT, “should not take rupture as the starting point.” 
(Dimitrov’s Telegram to Mao Zedong, 1941/1988) 
However, the occurrence of the incident made Mao 
Zedong believe that Moscow’s estimation and attitude, 
instead of his own, were wrong. In addition, Moscow did 
not reply his telegraph on January 15, so he repeatedly 
expressed his strong dissatisfaction with Moscow. On 
hearing the message that the New Fourth Army was 
annihilated, he angrily called Zhou Enlai to ask Chuikov, 
“Jiang Jieshi is so lawless, please ask Chuikov what shall 
I do?” However, the Soviet ambassador and military 
officer said that the current situation needed a global 
observation and arrangement, in particular an exploration 
on whether Jiang Jieshi had a secret liaison or a new 
negotiation with Japan. To determine whether Jiang Jieshi 
intentionally repudiated the cooperation, they should not 
only pay attention to the KMT troops in Central China, 
but also the movements of Hu Zongnan or other KMT 
troops. Although an active military preparation was 
needed, “today’s work center is still to continue the anti-
Japanese war”,6 but Mao Zedong insisted that Jiang Jieshi 
deliberately destructed the cooperation. On January 20, 
he simply told the leaders of all parties in telegram that, 
“the current problem is that the distant policy differs with 
our thoughts, which have not been resolved after three 
months’ repeated communication”.7
5 Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, p.489.
6 Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying and Dong Biwu’s telegram to Mao Zedong 
concerning the Soviet, US and UK ambassadors’ attitudes toward 
Wannan Incident (January 16, 1941).
7 Mao Zedong’s telegram to Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai and Liu 
Shaoqi Concerning the Changes in the KMT-CPC Relation after the 
January 17 Command and CPC’s Countermeasures. (January 20, 
1941), Wannan Incident (Selected Data), pp.183-184.
On February 5 Dimitrov called to stress that it was not 
inevitable to break with Jiang Jieshi, and CPC should have 
taken all possible actions to prevent rupture. Mao Zedong 
re-judged the overall political situation and pointed out, 
“Tojo said publicly, “North China is the base area for 
Japan. Jiang Jieshi expelled the CPC army in Central 
China to North China, which destroyed the interests of 
Japan.” This is something that we did not estimate in the 
past”; “Jiang Jieshi knew that the enemy would attack in 
one to three months. The reason that he provoked Wannan 
Incident, issued the January 17 command and deployed 
troops to attack the New Fourth Army in the areas of 
North Huai River, Eastern Anhui and Central Hubei was 
to try to stop enemy by attacking CPC... but the Japanese 
thought in another way”, so his” ‘anti-CPC’ program 
was completely broken.” Thus, he began to restate Zhu 
Pengjia’s view in 1940 telegram, indicating that CPC has 
already seen the serious consequences of the two parties’ 
tussle. With regard to Jiang Jieshi, he said, “the enemy’s 
attack was so anxious, January 17 command lost so much 
public support, his plans all went ruined and political 
council is about to open. We have to think of a measure to 
put him into a more unfavorable situation.” (Mao, 1941) 
This determined the strategy of focusing on political 
offensives according to the situation.
3 .  THE SOUTHERN BUREAU HAS 
FULLY IMPLEMENTED THE POLICY OF 
WINNING OVER THE MIDDLE FORCES 
AND ISOLATING THE STUBBORN FORCES
The CPC Central Committee was very concerned about 
the security of Zhou Enlai and other members of the South 
Bureau, called Zhou Enlai and Southern Bureau twice to 
retreat himself, Ye Jianying, Dong Biwu, Deng Yingchao 
and other important cadres of the office and newspaper 
office from Chongqing the earliest, and retreat non-
Party cadres rapidly to abroad or Southeast Asia, destruct 
important documents, telegrams and passwords, and carry 
out revolutionary integrity education to the personnel 
staying in the office to prepare for the worst. According 
to the instruction of CPC Central Committee, Zhou Enlai 
carefully arranged and timely conveyed the instruction to 
the organizations at all levels, hid, transferred and withdrew 
all Party and non-Party cadres under the direct leadership of 
Southern Bureau and all sympathizers in contact.
Zhou Enlai and Southern Bureau’s prompt disclosure 
of Wannan Incident’s truth made more and more people 
recognize that responsibility for the conflict was entirely 
on Jiang Jieshi, so more people became sympathetic to 
CPC and disappointed about KMT, and the necessity of 
solidarity has been reinforced. The results of Wannan 
Incident completely broke KMT’s expectation, promptly 
extinguished the anti-communism fuse negative to CPC, 
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completely reversed the direction of the situation, began 
to trap KMT into a deepening isolation, and managed to 
maintain the anti-Japanese national united front in struggles. 
Wannan Incident spurred adjustment in the KMT-
CPC relationship, leading to the differentiation and 
reorganization within the anti-Japanese national united 
front. CPC Central Committee and the Southern Bureau no 
longer put the focus of united front onto KMT, but turned 
to win over the middle forces, introduced third parties 
to help adjust the KMT-CPC relation, and increased the 
weight to cooperate and fight with KMT. This led to the 
major change in its future policy development. 
On the eve of Wannan Incident, middle party leaders 
had held secretly meetings to discuss the current situation 
and planned to set up a third party political alliance. After 
Wannan Incident, middle parties’ requirement for alliance 
became more intense, and the pace of alliance has been 
greatly accelerated. They made more active planning 
with each other as well as with the Southern Bureau. The 
middle parties expected to establish a closer relationship 
with CPC, which has been supported and greatly assisted 
by the Southern Bureau. Zhou Enlai reported to the CPC 
Central Committee that, small parties wanted to set up 
a democratic union outside KMT and CPC and invited 
CPC to participate in the leadership. The Bureau made 
much efforts on its establishment and hoped it would not 
incline toward KMT but truly remain neutral. The Bureau 
seized the opportunity of Wannan Incident to demonstrate 
the intention to strengthen the United Front: Currently, 
strengthen propaganda and explanation to middle parties, 
turn the unfavorable factors of Wannan Incident into 
favorable factors; in the long run, make every effort to 
promote middle parties to be allied and neutral, strengthen 
the checks and balances in China’s political arena, 
consolidate and promote the united front.
Because of the efforts of Southern Bureau, China 
Democratic Political League has been secretly established 
in Chongqing. The CPC Central Committee made a report 
on Yan’an Liberation Daily and published an editorial to 
express strong support for the League. Southern Bureau 
gave active and effective supports and assistances in the 
practical work. Thanks to the tireless efforts of Southern 
Bureau represented by Zhou Enlai, the middle forces 
began to turn from the previous right position to the real 
neutral position. The Southern Bureau has shown the 
strength and will of CPC, established a certain degree of 
solidarity to middle parties, provided conditions for the 
development of the subsequent democratic movement 
centered by CPC, and created a good environment for the 
united front and close cooperation with the middle parties 
in the KMT controlled areas. 
CONCLUSION
The KMT-CPC relation during the Anti-Japanese War was 
still constrained by the overall war situation. Regardless 
of how many conflicts of interest between KMT and 
CPC, how KMT despised the outfits of CPC or how CPC 
despised KMT, the two parties eventually gave up their 
own interests to comply with the interests of the Anti-
Japanese War. Therefore, even if a considerable part of 
the KMT leaders long had the intention to “exterminate” 
CPC, whether before or after the incident, they ultimately 
refrained their actions after weighed the pros and cons. 
Similarly, after suffered the heavy losses, CPC could 
have taken more drastic measures for retaliation, but their 
leaders always took into account the fact of continuing to 
fight against Japan, thus limited the intensity and range of 
their retaliation policy. The Southern Bureau represented 
by Zhou Enlai has made maximum efforts to create 
favorable conditions for the northward movement of 
New Fourth Army, supplying good conditions to dissolve 
the unfavorable factors after Wannan Incident. It can be 
seen that during the war, national conflict was always 
higher than the contradiction between the two parties. 
No matter how intensive the conflicts became between 
KMT and CPC, they moved towards the compromises and 
maintained the contest always along the direction of Anti-
Japanese national united front.
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